

## Message Text

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TAGS: PARM, UR, US, OEXD

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR TEST BAN TECHNICAL TALKS:

JUNE 23 WORKING MEETING

1. IN FOUR-MAN SESSION (STOESSEL, MOROKHOV, TIMERBAEV, TERRELL AND INTERPRETER) STOESSEL PRESENTED US VERSIONS OF TITLE, PREAMBLE, AND ARTICLE I, II AND IV OF DRAFT AGREEMENT. WITH RESPECT TO THE PREAMBLE AND THE REVISED LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE I, HE EXPLAINED THAT WE CONSIDERED IT WOULD BE QUICKER AND SIMPLER TO CONFORM LANGUAGE AS NEARLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENTS THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN WORKED OUT, RATHER THEN EMBARK ON NEW LANGUAGE. SIMILARLY, HE SUGGESTED DELETION OF SOVIET ARTICLE IV BECAUSE DECLARATORY LANGUAGE BELONGS IN THE PREAMBLE, NOT IN THE OPERATIVE PROVISIONS. HE EXPLAINED THE CHANGES IN THE TITLE AND ARTICLES I AND II AS BEING ASSOCIATED WITH OUR VIEWS ON THE LOWER THRESHOLD AND QUOTA AND ON PNES. ARTICLE II WAS ALSO MODIFIED IN ORDER TO TIE THE DATA EXCHANGE REQUIREMENTS MORE CLOSELY TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY. MOROKHOV NOTED THERE WERE BIG DIFFERENCES, PARTICULARLY IN ARTICLE I. JUDGING BY HIS INSTRUCTIONS, HE SAID, HE WAS RATHER PESSIMISTIC.

2. STOESSEL SAID HE WOULD COVER ARTICLES III, V AND VI LATER; FOR NOW HE HAD SOME QUESTIONS WHICH WERE NOT BEING ASKED ON INSTRUCTIONS.

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3. WAS THERE ANY REASON THE SOVIETS HAD REQUESTED THIS AS AN

AGREEMENT RATHER THAN AS A TREATY? TIMERBAEV RECALLED THAT IN THE PAST WE HAD MADE SEVERAL UNDERSTANDINGS IN THE FORM OF AGREEMENTS RATHER THAN TREATIES, PRINCIPALLY SO THE US COULD HAVE MORE ROOM FOR MANEUVER INTERNALLY. MOROKHOV INDICATED THAT THIS IS SOMETHING THE SOVIETS COULD THINK OF IF WE WANTED TO SUGGEST A TREATY.

4. WHAT TYPE OF MECHANISMS WERE INTENDED IN ARTICLE III PARAGRAPH 3 IN THE SOVIET DRAFT? WAS AN SSC-TYPE ARRANGEMENT IN MIND? MOROKHOV REPLIED THAT THEY HAD NO STANDING BODY IN MIND. HOWEVER, IF THERE WERE MISUNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN THE SIDES, THE RIGHT TO MAKE INQUIREIS WOULD BE SPELLED OUT, ALONG WITH THE OBLIGATION TO REPLY.

5. WHY WAS THE DURATION IN ARTICLE V FIVE YEARS? MOROKHOV SAID THERE WERE TWO REASONS. FIRST AS WE PROCEEDED TO OUR AIM OF BANNING ALL TESTS, WE MIGHT WISH TO UNDERTAKE SIMULTANEOUSLY OTHER STEPS WHICH WOULD INFLUENCE OR AFFECT THE PROVISION OF THIS AGREEMENT. FOR THAT REASON, IT WOULD NOT BE ADVISABLE TO MAKE THE AGREEMENT OF INDEFINITE DURATION. SECOND, WE CANNOT FORESEE HOW THE WORLD SITUATION WILL DEVELOP. CHANGES IN THAT SITUATION COULD LEAD US TO DESIRE TO AMEND THIS AGREEMENT.

6. WHAT WAS THE BACKGROUND OF SOVIET THINKING IN THE ARTICLE VI ACCESSION PROVISION? MOROKHOV NOTED THAT IT WAS TIED TO NPT OBLIGATIONS, BUT THEY WOULD BE INTERESTED TO CONSIDER ANY OTHER SUGGESTIONS WITH REGARD TO ACCESSION BY THE US.

7. IN TURNING TO THE TECHNICAL ANNEX, MOROKHOV INFORMED STOESSEL PRIVATELY THAT THEIR EXPERTS WOULD INCLUDE, BESIDES THEIR SEISMOLOGISTS, OSIN AND PYRIKOV. WALSH WAS SUMMONED FROM THE EMBASSY JOIN OUR SCIENTISTS TO BALANCE THE SOVIET MILITARY TYPES.

8. MOROKHOV BEGAN BY NOTING THAT OUR DRAFT WAS NOT SUITABLY FORMULATED FOR USE AS AN ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT; IT SHOULD BE SHORTER AND MORE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE PURPOSES OF THE AGREEMENT. HE THEN TURNED TO SAFRONOV, WHO NOTED THAT THE VERIFICATION OF AN UPPER AND LOWER THRESHOLD AND QUOTA DOES  
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NOT REQUIRE EXACT DETERMINATION OF THE YIELD OF EVERY SHOT. THE US PROPOSAL SUBSTANTIALLY EXCEEDS THE VOLUME OF DATA REQUIRED FOR VERIFICATION. THE US IS ASKING FOR THREE CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION, EACH ONE OF WHICH WOULD BE SUFFICIENT IN ITSELF: COORDINATES AND GEOLOGY, YIELD MAGNITUDE CURVE, AND YIELDS OF CALIBRATION SHOTS. ADEQUATE DATA WOULD BE AS FOLLOWS: GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES OF BOUNDARIES OF TEST SITES IN TESTING AREAS, INFORMATION ON THE GEOLOGY OF TESTING AREAS, AND

GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS AFTER THEY HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED. THE SOVIET DRAFT PROTOCOL WAS THEN PASSED OUT (SEPTEL).

9. STOESSEL THEN SAID WE WOULD STUDY THE SOVIET DRAFT PROTOCOL AND THAT IT AND THE US DRAFT TECHNICAL REPORT SHOULD OFFER A BASIS FOR MOVING FORWARD TO PRODUCE A JOINT BRACKETED TEXT. FOR NOW, HW WANTED TO PRESENT THE FOLLOWING PROVISION ON DATA REQUIREMENTS FOR PNES WHICH SHOULD BE ADDED TO WHATEVER PROTOCOL OR REPORT WE PRODUCE:

10. BEGIN TEXT. DATA ON NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. THE SAME ITEMS OF GEOLOGICAL AND GEO-PHYSICAL INFORMATION IN THE VICINITY OF THE SHOT POINT AS REQUIRED FOR THE SPECIFIED TEST SITES. IN ADDITION, THERE SHALL BE PROVIDED ADEQUATE NOTIFICATION AT LEAST TWO MONTHS PRIOR TO THE SHOT, A SCHEDULED DETONATION TIME UPDATED AS NECESSARY TO THE ACTUAL SHOT TIME, THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF THE EVENT, THE LOCATION TO THE NEAREST SECOND OF LATITUDE AND LONGITUDE, THE EXPECTED YIELD OF THE DEVICE OR DEVICES USED, THE DEPTH OR DEPTHS OF BURIAL, AND THE POST-SHOT MEASUREMENT OF YIELD. END TEXT.

11. MOROKHOV NOTED THE US DATA REQUIREMENTS FOR PNES WERE MORE EXTENSIVE THAN FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS. STOESSEL REPLIED THAT THIS WAS BECAUSE PNE APPLICATIONS WERE CONDUCTED OFF WEAPON TEST SITES.

12. THE RESTRICTED GROUP THEN MET TO DISCUSS HOW TO PROCEED. STOESSEL MADE CLEAR THAT WE HAD TO PROCEED IN PARALLEL. WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO PRODUCE A JOINT BRACKETED TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT IF AT THE SAME TIME WE PRODUCED A JOINT BRACKETED TEXT OF A PROTOCOL. MOROKHOV FULLY AGREED. HE EXPLAINED THE SOVIET INTENTION WAS NOT TO PRODUCE A COUNTER  
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DRAFT. HIS FIRST INSTRUCTION TO HIS DELEGATION HAD BEEN TO WORK FROM THE US TEXT. THE SOVIET EXPERTS HAD FOUND, HOWEVER, THAT OUR TEXT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO ADAPT AS THE PROTOCOL TO AN AGREEMENT. IT WAS THEN DECIDED THAT TIMERBAEV, TERRELL, IFFT AND OBUKHOV WOULD MEET AT 4 P.M. TO PRODUCE A BRACKETED JOINT TEXT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE AGREEMENT STOESSEL HAD COVERED THIS MORNING, AND AT 5 P. M. THEY WOULD MEET (WITH THE ADDITION OF ROMNEY AND SAFRONOV) TO PRODUCE A BRACKETED JOINT TEXT OF A TECHNICAL PROTOCOL ON WHATEVER BASIS WAS MOST FEASIBLE. STOESSEL

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